

# Ex-CIA director tells his views but not secrets

By RAMSEY CAMPBELL  
Sentinel Star

**HOWEY-IN-THE-HILLS** — By his own admission, William Colby is nondescript.

Sitting in the lounge at Mission Inn Golf and Tennis Resort, quietly sipping a gin and tonic and listening to the house duo play "Spanish Eyes," Colby looks like a successful accountant unwinding after a tough day at the office.

Colby spoke Friday night to a Lake County Executive Club meeting at the Leesburg Community Center. Colby was staying at the Mission Inn Friday night after his address.



A short wiry man with graying hair and amber-framed glasses to correct acute nearsightedness, Colby fades easily into a crowd.

He doesn't look like a spy, let alone the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency who from September 1973 until January 1976 held more secrets in his head than anyone.

"Of course as each year goes by there are fewer and fewer. But I still have some," he said tapping his temple.

Colby, 60, a career officer for the CIA who was appointed director of the agency by President Nixon to replace James Schlesinger, was in turn replaced in 1976 by George Bush.

Colby was director of the agency during a turbulent period of more than three years, which saw charges of CIA activity behind Watergate, foreign assassination attempts on Castro and other Communist leaders, and charges of illegal involvement in domestic affairs.

He spent much of his energy as director testifying in front of any number of congressional committees investigating the CIA at the time. And Colby said it was his willingness to explain the CIA's role that finally cost him his job.

"Anyone else might have tried to stonewall it like they had always done in the past," he said. "But I saw the need to explain what we were doing to the American people."

"At the time the CIA was fighting for its survival." In the 25 years he served in the CIA, Colby said there had been three revolutionary changes in intelligence gathering: the centralization of intelligence in the early 1950s, the growth of sophisticated technology in the 1960s, and the realization in the middle-1970s that the CIA had to follow certain legal boundaries.

The furor that surrounded the sensational CIA revelations while Colby was director has begun to die down, he said, predicting that President Carter's promise of a new charter for the CIA signals an acceptance of intelligence operations.

"The pendulum is swinging back again, it will never be where it was before, but then it shouldn't," he said.

Colby said he thought the biggest threat in the future will come from Central America. Other "flash-points" will be South Africa and the Middle East during the 1980s, he predicted.

"Great power has been a monopoly of great nations," he said. "But great power, thanks to science and technology, now comes in small packages."

In answer to a question from the audience, Colby said he thought Carter would continue a gradual escalation of pressure on Iran in order to gain the release of the 50 American hostages in that country. He said he thought the Iranians would let the hostages go, but are "just looking for a face-saver."

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Nic & Vic: Afterwords STATION WTTG TV  
DATE January 27, 1980 10:30 PM CITY Washington, DC  
SUBJECT William Colby Interviewed

NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN: Welcome, Bill Colby.

William Colby is, I think, known to almost all Americans as the former head of the CIA, a man who has spent most of his life dealing with foreign policy and defense matters.

And it's a delight to have you here, even though I don't agree with anything you're going to say.

WILLIAM COLBY: It's a pleasure to be here.

VICTOR LASKY: He's typically open-minded. You know that, Mr. Colby.

COLBY: Right.

LASKY: Well, let's get down to what seems to be the emerging pattern, as far as the congressional attitude towards CIA. It's a new attitude. It's an attitude which takes into consideration the feeling that there's a necessity for the CIA, there's a necessity for operations which up to now had to be cleared with about -- how many? How many congressional...

COLBY: Eight committees.

LASKY: Eight committees. That's several hundred people. And that's absurd.

COLBY: Absurd.

LASKY: Because every time the CIA would venture forth with a so-called secret or covert operation, it would appear in

the pages of The Washington Post the next day, or at least two days.

COLBY: Every one that we briefed them on in 1975 blew.

LASKY: It did blow on the pages of the press. Well, you know, you can't run an operation that way.

What is your feeling about the President's new policy?

COLBY: Well, I think it's long overdue, quite frankly. For a couple of centuries we didn't think we needed any intelligence. Then we adopted the foreign concept of intelligence, which was total secrecy. And then we got surprised at that and horrified at it, and then we said, "Let's have total exposure." And now we're discovering that that doesn't work either. And so we're going back to a sensible middle course, with the constitutional controls on intelligence, but not total exposure.

LASKY: Well, let's say -- what if we had gone back to that a year ago. What would be different in the world?

COLBY: Well, I think that CIA can do various things in various countries fairly well. It's done some good jobs. You've heard a lot about the failures or the abuses, but you haven't heard about the successful ones. There were successes in the Congo in the early '60s. There were successes in Laos. There were successes in Western Europe in 1950. There were successes in the Philippines. There've been a lot of successes.

LASKY: The trouble is that what might have been successes in years past later on might take the coloration of being non-successes in the eyes -- at least as far as public opinion is concerned. I would suggest to you that, without getting into the Iranian matter, where I assume a CIA operation took effect in 1953 and the Shah was returned to the Peacock Throne -- that was considered a great success at one time. And now, I would venture to say, there's a good segment of opinion that would suggest that it was not that much of a success.

COLBY: Well, I think on a scale of history, 25 years of good relations, 25 years of a good government, which increased the literacy rate from 15 to 50 percent, the life expectancy of the average Iranian from 44 to 53 years, which created a whole middle class there which hadn't existed, which compare -- you compare Iran and the two neighboring states of Pakistan and Iraq, and ask which one of those three seemed to make the best progress over these years.

Now, I'm not going to say nothing wrong ever happened. Don't get me wrong. But I'd say 25 years of that kind of pro-

gress, as against the turmoil that threatened in 1953 and is there today, was a pretty good 25 years.

VON HOFFMAN: Well, let's -- just for the sake of argument, I'll accept that with some reservations. But let me ask you...

LASKY: I'll accept it...

VON HOFFMAN: I know you'll accept it.

But look, what about the last year, the last two years? What could the CIA have done, if it had been, quote, unchained, unfettered, in 1978?

COLBY: Well, let's talk about when it was fettered, which was in 1974.

VON HOFFMAN: Right. Four years of fettering, and all those years of unfettering.

COLBY: Well, the point is -- I'm not sure -- I'm not going to say that just one little flick of the wrist and everything would have been all right. Don't get me wrong. But I do say that the CIA has certainly been discouraged, to put it mildly, from any kind of operations of this nature around the world in the last seven years, since '73-74.

LASKY: And we're talking about, I think...

VON HOFFMAN: Since Chile.

COLBY: Well, yeah, since Chile. And the gross misrepresentation of what actually happened there. Because if you'll look at the history, you'll find the CIA had nothing to do with the overthrow of Mr. Allende or his death. I mean most people say, "That's a CIA coup." It wasn't. CIA involved in an effort to bring about a coup in 1970 for the long period of six weeks. And then it went back to its basic strategy of building up the decent, moderate center people, Christian Democrats, the nationalists in Chile; not the right wing, not the military.

VON HOFFMAN: Okay. In that case, look -- all right. I don't want to get off on Chile. But I think the question again and again comes back to: If you were unfettered, could you -- would you have kept the Shah on the throne? Would that have been the policy? And would you have been able to do it?

COLBY: Well, the President of the United States, a year or so ago, said that we support the Shah, but we won't interfere. Now, to me that's a contradiction in terms.

VON HOFFMAN: I must admit, when I heard him say that, I said, "Well, what does that mean?"

COLBY: Well, it means nothing.

VON HOFFMAN: Right.

COLBY: Because you can't do both. You've got to choose one or the other.

[Confusion of voices]

COLBY: I have no problems about helping our friends in other countries meet the kind of challenges from our enemies in those countries and their supporters from the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

VON HOFFMAN: Well, do you -- are you also sitting here and telling me, sir, that you believe that an unfettered CIA would have been able to prevent the Ayatollah and his compa -- or his colleagues from taking power?

COLBY: To me, the really critical absence in the Iranian situation was that the Shah did not build an active political base underneath all these good things that he did. They were practical things to be contributed. They were matched by some things that he did were wrong: corruption, human rights abuses, things like that. No question about it. But he did not build the kind of active political base, for example, that Charles De Gaulle had under him when he faced a revolution in 1968. And he turned a couple of political switches, and 200,000 people marched down the Champs Elysees and said, "Stop this nonsense. We want him." Now, that didn't happen with the Shah.

LASKY: Let me ask -- may I ask, perhaps, an embarrassing question. While you were Director of the CIA, which was, what, '73 to '76?

COLBY: Right.

LASKY: Three or four years. And you had a great deal of knowledge of our conduct of covert activities, if they were covert, in Iran. Did we cooperate with the SAVAK, the Iranian secret police, to the extent where we engaged or helped them engage in torture and all that sort of thing that we hear critics so often manifest themselves?

COLBY: We certainly cooperated with SAVAK. For one thing, we had those very valuable intelligence monitoring posts on the mountains up in Northern Iran telling us what kinds of weapons the Soviets were developing, what kind of nuclear missiles, and so forth.

So, did we cooperate with SAVAK? Yes. Did we help them on torture? Absolutely not. CIA has never helped anybody on torture. It hasn't provided the equipment. It hasn't provided the training.

LASKY: Well, I'm glad to hear that.

COLBY: The best evidence of that was Philip Agee, no friend of CIA. And he said that at one point when he worked for CIA he was sending some Latin American security people up to Washington so they'd get some CIA training so they no longer would use the kind of torture they had.

LASKY: Well, thank you, Mr. Colby. I'm going to the audience. And I think the first question is with this gentleman.

What is your name, sir?

MAN: Dean Palevi (?).

LASKY: All right, Mr. Palevi.

DEAN PALEVI: I wanted to ask a question concerning the policy of containment. It seems to me that the American policy of containment has not always taken into consideration democracy, and the United States has often supported regimes that aren't necessarily very democratic.

Now, considering the fall of Vietnam and the fall of the Shah, would you say our policy of containment has been successful?

COLBY: Well, I'd say that a policy of containment avoided a third world war for about 30 years. Now, that's not bad for a policy. And that's exactly what it was designed to do. It was designed to prevent a thrust by the Soviets into the areas around them, and not put us to the position where we had to use our military force to hold them. Now, our policy of containment worked in that respect.

As for supporting right-wing and so forth. If you'll look around the world, you'll find that anytime we had a choice in a situation, we supported democratic, responsible, moderate leaders. And if you look at the Philippines, if you look at Japan, you look at Southeast Asia -- Diem versus who? Versus the French puppet, versus the Communists.

We were seeking the kind of decent leadership -- and it was decent leadership for a long time -- that gave us a better hope.

Now, there are some places we never had that choice.

In some places there wasn't any of that kind of leadership. And at that point the question was whether you wanted that country to become a Communist country, failing any containment, or whether you would be willing to support that leadership.

LASKY: Any other -- anyone else? Yes, sir?

MAN: I'd like to ask you, Mr. Colby. I understand from what you've said that you support -- you say you have no problem with helping our friends in ways which you have described. For example, that we have, as you say, helped SAVAK. We did help them.

My question...

COLBY: Not in torture, I hasten to add.

MAN: You said that, and that was my -- that's what I was coming to. Jesse Leaf, who used to be the CIA's Iran Desk officer, in charge of Iranian intelligence collection, has written in The New York Times that, in fact, the CIA was training SAVAK in methods of torture which derived from the SS in Nazi Germany.

LASKY: Well, you know, we can get -- we can get the answer.

COLBY: Well, you know, that's just nonsense. I can assure you that it's flat nonsense. It may be his words, but it's nonsense.

I know what kind of training we've given other intelligence services around the world, and I know very well that we never taught anybody torture.

VON HOFFMAN: But you do admit you have a credibility problem as an institution.

COLBY: Oh, sure. I don't have any problem. But I say the best answer to your question is: Ask the Senate Committee on Intelligence. Ask the House Committee on Intelligence. Ask them to look into it. Because they can get the individual officers up there under oath, and they'll find out whether we taught torture or not. And I can assure you they'll come out and say we didn't.

Do you honestly think that after the enormous investigations about CIA by the Congress, that if we had taught torture it wouldn't have come out by now?

MAN: I think that the burning question is not that. The burning -- because the CIA has been able to cover up so many of its operations, and the Church Committee only uncovered some

of them. There are many more that still will come out.

COLBY: The Church Committee got anything they asked for, in terms of the operations. They didn't get the names of the people, because we insisted that they not get the names of the people we dealt with. But in terms of operations, they got a full exposure. And they made a full investigation of the 25 years of CIA's history.

MAN: Most of the Church report is still classified, is it not?

COLBY: It may be classified. But I guaranty you, you ask any of the congressmen and senators whether there's any classified chapter that talks about torture. And I can assure you there isn't.

VON HOFFMAN: We've got to break away....

[End of interview]



## *Defusing Future Tehrans*

# Ex-Director Envisions CIA as 'Peacemaker'

By DAN CUPPER  
Staff Writer

ANNVILLE — An emerging role for intelligence-gathering agencies, that of defusing tensions between superpowers and third-world countries, is envisioned by the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

William E. Colby, addressing about 700 persons Tuesday at the second-semester chapel convocation of Lebanon Valley College, said the "hope of the 1980s" is that intelligence can be used to "spread problems out on the negotiating table."

Such problems, he said, are likely to be born of a widening economic gap between affluent and poor nations, a gap which he considers the most serious threat to national security. Fueled by poverty and overpopulation, he said, "enormous pressures are building up in the Third World."

"Until now, the great power has been held by the great nations. Now, small packages of that great power, in chemical, biological and nuclear form, are being held by smaller nations."

"The gap between poverty and affluence produces thoughts of envy, and poor nations are looking for tools to balance the distribution of wealth. They can do this by economic means through cartels, by political means through demagoguery and by violent means through tur-

moil such as in Iran, or turmoil narrowly targeted as terrorism.

"With knowledge (gathered through intelligence), we can identify and counter policies and weapons by showing that we're prepared. In this way, the world is able to solve the problems that these countries are having."

Necessarily, he said, this involves agencies such as the CIA lending support to sympathetic factions. In Iran, he said, the CIA "gave some support to the shah (Mohammed Reza Pahlavi) to return to power in 1953 and we've had 25 years of good diplomatic relations. We didn't make a garden out of Iran, but it was better than the turmoil going on there now."

Responding to challenges and threats requires "some alternative between simply (issuing) a diplomatic protest on the one hand, and sending in the Marines and a carrier task force, on the other," he said.

In an earlier news conference, Colby, who headed the CIA between 1973 and 1976, said that the loss of intelligence-gathering stations in Iran following the rise to power of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini will have a minimal effect on U.S. efforts to monitor Soviet arms proliferation.

It will take just a "short time" before new monitoring stations are established elsewhere, just as the United States replaced sites lost ear-

lier in Turkey. And "even if they (the Russians) cheat" on arms treaties, he said, "we'll be able to catch them because it will be not too long a time before new stations can be established."

Despite dimming chances for its ratification in the U.S. Senate because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Colby said he favors the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty because it would "limit the growth of these terrible weapons."

He also said he doesn't expect the expulsion of American reporters from Iran to have much effect.

"Information doesn't succeed in being bottled up," he said, noting that other news services would continue to operate. Besides, he said, developments in Iran would be reported "through normal diplomatic workings of communication and transportation" and "by courageous people."

He pointed out that when Vietnam came under Communist control, predictions that all news from that country would cease proved false. He cited the boat people, who after their escape told the "real facts" about Communist domination.

Colby praised President Jimmy Carter's handling of the hostage situation in Iran, calling it "responsible." He said he approved of Carter's method of "gradually increasing pressure through the rally-

ing of world opinion.

"The American people deserve enormous credit for supporting this kind of treatment rather than demanding immediate military action."

He said he was "not surprised" by the invasion of Afghanistan because of indications that he'd seen earlier; not in intelligence reports but in the press. These included reports of an increase in the number of Soviet advisers in the country; of an internal power struggle; and of a massive buildup of Soviet troops on the Afghanistan-U.S.S.R. border.

"When they moved, they moved fast, but I was not surprised," Colby said.

By contrast, he said, he was surprised by the overthrow of the shah in Iran.

"The factual information was there, but the likelihood that Khomeini would be the spark to set it off? Nobody knew that," he said.



William E. Colby

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM NewsTalk-98

STATION WRC Radio

DATE January 14, 1980 7:51 AM CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT The Hughes-Ryan Bill

JIM BOHANAN: We're 30 seconds away from a look at the situation with our intelligence gathering agencies, and maybe a breakthrough for them. Stay tuned.

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BOHANAN: Sometime back Congress decided to tighten control of our intelligence gathering. Now WRC's Richard Day says the pendulum is swinging back.

RICHARD DAY: At the start of the '70s it began, evidence, stories that clouded the reputation of the once pristine CIA. Links with the mob, attempted assassinations of world leaders. It was tawdry stuff indeed, and politicians were drawn to it like a magnet. The Central Intelligence Agency was too arcane, too autonomous and even arrogant.

To slap it down, Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Bill in 1973, sharply curtailing the purview of the agency, if not, in the opinion of some, emasculating it.

That bill required any planned covert missions to be put before no fewer than eight Capitol Hill committees. As critics of the bill said, almost a guarantee of failure. Spread out before 150 or so legislators and their staffs, all it needed was one leak to the media and the operation was no longer covert.

Now, former CIA Director William Colby is pleased to hear that President Carter wants Congress to repeal that act.

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PROGRAM ABC News Closeup

STATION WJLA TV  
ABC Network

DATE January 13, 1980 7:00 PM

CITY Washington, DC

SUBJECT Segment of Escape from Justice

TIM O'BRIEN: This report concerns allegations that there are more than 200 Nazi war criminals now living in America, and that collectively they are responsible for the deaths of as many as two million people. This report will also explore how these Nazis and Nazi collaborators came to this country and how they have managed to stay. And it will present evidence which indicates that some of them have been recruited, protected, and even employed by the United States Government.

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O'BRIEN: But beyond those who lied their way into the country, others were actually brought in. Nazis were ardent anti-Communists, and many of them had important military or scientific knowledge. Thus they were considered valuable in the new fight against the Soviets.

SIMON WIESENTHAL: I am sure that during the Cold War was some plan to bring such people and to use them.

O'BRIEN: Documents only recently available prove there was such a plan.

Here at the U.S. National Archives and at government agencies throughout Washington are stored hundreds of thousands of documents concerning the atrocities committed before and during World War II. Many of these documents grew out of U.S. efforts to prosecute Nazis. But some tell of efforts to actually recruit them.

ABC News has learned of one high-level intelligence program that not only allowed war criminals into this country,

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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
10 JANUARY 1980

## Theory and Practice:

# A Diplomats' Debate, in the Shadow of Iran



Ex-CIA head William Colby.

By Boris Weintraub  
Washington Star Staff Writer

It's one of those questions that confront all diplomats at some time, a nuts-and-bolts question that nonetheless spills over into the policy field — particularly at a time when the shadow of Iran looms so large.

The question is this: When you are a diplomat, do you maintain contact with the opposition to the established government in the country?

Simple, perhaps. But then the questions start to multiply, and take unusual twists and turns, and start doubling back on each other, and pretty soon, it becomes a very, very delicate matter:

How do you decide what is legitimate opposition and what is a kooky fringe? At what level should any contact be made? What do you do if you are serving in an authoritarian country that considers such contacts ground for grave displeasure? How do you make such contacts so as to get the proper information you need without making it seem that you are encouraging the opposition to expect U.S. support?

So when a covey of diplomatic practitioners who made up a very substantial segment of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment for the last three decades, as well as at least half a dozen foreign envoys to Washington, got together yesterday at Georgetown University in a sea of gray-flannel pinstripes to discuss the issue, it seemed not very simple at all.

They were gathered for the first time under the auspices of the relatively new Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown's School of Foreign

Service, which is intended to raise questions like these, questions of diplomatic processes, diplomatic mechanics, rather than those in the policy area. But as the discussion proceeded, the policy questions were unavoidable. And, as it is almost everywhere these days, the Iranian spectre was present.

The panelists discussing the issue provide a fair index to the level of participants in the symposium. They included former CIA Director William Colby; former Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker; former Ambassador to the United Nations Charles Yost; Thomas L. Hughes, president of the Carnegie Endowment and a former diplomat; and John Wills Tuthill, former ambassador to, among other places, Brazil. (Henry Kissinger spoke in an afternoon session, but put his appearance totally off the record.)

Almost everyone agreed that American diplomats abroad should maintain some sort of contact with the opposition. But that was merely a starting point. Almost everyone provided horror stories of one sort or another designed to show that this is easier said than done, and that, even if good contacts are established, it may not mean a thing to the execution of American foreign policy.

"When I was serving in France in the 1950s," said Yost, a career diplomat, "some of us saw the probability that the government would fall and that Charles de Gaulle would come to power. We did our best to cultivate those around him. But the problem was a rift between the United States and de Gaulle going back before World War II. That created a resentment in the general's mind which plagued us later."

Hughes harkened back to his days as deputy chief of mission in London during 1969 and 1970, when a flap developed over whether the U.S. should close its consulate in Southern Rhodesia to protest the refusal of Rhodesian whites to share power with blacks.

As he described it, the American ambassador to London, Walter Annenberg, "spent most of his time" dealing with the Labor government of Harold Wilson fell to the embassy's political officer, who

the Conservatives. Meanwhile, the Conservative opposition of Edward Heath, which was about to depose the Labor government, was establishing its own secret contacts with Kissinger and his staff in the Nixon White House, which, in contrast to the policy of the State Department, was tilting in favor of the Ian Smith regime and "practicing benign neglect" toward black Africa.

In that jumbled context, said Hughes, who was the opposition?

Over and over again, the panelists and members of the audience, which included a large number of former high-ranking ambassadors and State Department officials past and present, complained that they knew of opposition to established regimes that were gaining strength in their countries and eventually took power. Again and again, they told of reporting this to Washington, but being ignored by policy-makers here for one frustrating reason or another.

"The problem may be that at home, at the highest levels, there is a predisposition to see the situation in a certain way, and a reluctance to move away from a particular policy," said Yost in quiet diplomatese.

Certainly, the most fervent arguments about contacts with the opposition were stirred up over the subject of Iran, where even former Ambassador Richard Helms, a career intelligence official, has conceded that the U.S. was the victim of an intelligence failure.

Helms, in an article written for an

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
PARADE MAGAZINE  
6 January 1980

Walter Scott's

# **Personality Parade**

*Q. Is it a fact that Richard Helms and William Colby, both former directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, hate each other so much that neither will appear in the same room with the other? What is the source of their enmity?—J.L., Arlington, Va.*

*A. Colby does not hate Helms, but Helms was found guilty of perjured testimony before a Senate committee and reportedly holds Colby responsible for releasing the "family jewels"—those CIA in-house secrets that subsequently brought him down. As director of the CIA, Helms believed he was working for the President of the U.S.; Colby believed he was working for the people. The difference in philosophies is responsible for the enmity, more pronounced on Helms's side than Colby's.*

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PRESS RELEASE

The United States and William E. Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence, have reached agreement on the settlement of a dispute arising from Mr. Colby's publication, prior to CIA security review and <sup>approval</sup> ~~clearance~~, of a book containing information concerning intelligence activities. Agency review of the book was required because, as a former CIA employee, Mr. Colby is bound under secrecy agreements to obtain <sup>approval</sup> ~~clearance~~ before dissemination any material relating to CIA intelligence activities.

In August of 1977, Mr. Colby submitted a copy of the manuscript of the book, eventually published as Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA, simultaneously to his publisher and to the CIA for its pre-publication approval. In the Agency's view, these circumstances constituted a breach of Mr. Colby's obligations. Although the publisher received the manuscript with the understanding that final approval for publication was subject to CIA review, further dissemination of the manuscript occurred before Agency approval.

The CIA had referred the matter to the Department of Justice asking that litigation against Mr. Colby be considered. Such litigation was averted by the agreement reached today.

In the settlement, Mr. Colby has agreed to pay \$10,000 to the United States. He also has promised to submit all materials containing uncleared intelligence information for CIA pre-publication review prior to release to any unauthorized person.



SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

In full and complete settlement of the dispute arising from the publication of a manuscript containing intelligence information prior to Central Intelligence Agency pre-publication review and clearance, William E. Colby and the United States agree as follows:

1. As a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency ("the CIA" or "the Agency"), William E. Colby continues to be bound by two secrecy agreements which he signed on July 26, 1950 and October 1, 1958 as a condition of his employment with the CIA. Pursuant to the terms of the 1958 agreement, he agreed, inter alia: (i) not to publish or participate in the publication of any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of his employment, without specific prior approval by the Agency; and (ii) not to discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it, classified information relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, its activities or to intelligence materials under the control of the Agency.

2. In August 1977, Mr. Colby mailed to his publisher, Simon and Schuster, a manuscript containing a description of his career with the Agency which was eventually published under the title Honorable Men: My Life In The CIA. The manuscript was forwarded to the publisher with the understanding that the author's final approval for publication was subject to any changes that the CIA might require after its review. Simultaneously, Mr. Colby submitted the manuscript to the Agency for pre-publication approval. Simon and Schuster at a later time further disseminated the original manuscript to a French publisher. It was under these circumstances that the obligation under the secrecy agreements was breached through the dissemination of the manuscript before CIA clearance.



3. In consideration of the above, William Colby agrees:

a) To submit to the Agency for its review and clearance prior to release to any person who is not authorized by the CIA to read such materials, all future writings containing materials not previously cleared, including prepared texts of speeches, which relate to the CIA, its activities, intelligence activities generally, or intelligence sources and methods.

(b) In addition, having provided an accounting to the United States for all revenues, gains, profits, royalties, and other financial advantages derived from the publication of the book, Honorable Men: My Life In The CIA, to pay to the Treasury of the United States the sum of \$10,000 within ten (10) days of the execution of this agreement.

c) That he will not contest at any time his obligation to abide by the CIA policy statements or regulations on pre-publication review consistent with the secrecy agreements referred to in paragraph 1.

4. The United States agrees:

a) That Agency review shall be completed within thirty (30) days after receipt of material intended for publication and that approval for publication will be withheld only for information which the Agency determines to be classified or classifiable.

b) Further, in consideration of the above stipulations by William Colby and in light of his otherwise consistent adherence to the terms of the Secrecy Agreements, the United States agrees that no suit will be brought against Mr. Colby for the breach referred to in Paragraph 2.

Barbara S. Woodall  
Counsel for United States

William E. Colby

Mitchell Rogovin  
Counsel for William E. Colby

Dated: \_\_\_\_\_